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Abstract
We resolve the impossibility introduced by [6] and show that, in mar-
riage markets, any mechanism that is individually rational and respects
pairwise unanimity is strategy-proof on a restricted domain of prefer-
ences. Respect for pairwise unanimity, de¯ned by [6], is interpreted as the
minimally-weakened stability property supported by the farsighted view-
point. Our restriction on domain of preferences requires each agent to
prefer oneself the best or the second best. It is supported by both theo-
retically and empirically and is related to uniqueness of matching that is
individually rational and respects pairwise unanimity.
JEL Classi¯cation - C71, C72, C78, D71, D78
Keywords - matching, mechanism, strategy-proofness, uniqueness, re-
spect for pairwise unanimity
1 Introduction
Matching is one of the important functions of markets. Who gets which jobs,
which school admits which applicants, who marries whom and etc, these prob-
lems are very important for those people who are involved in the problems since
the outcomes of the problems have a great e®ect on their lives and careers. The
theory of two-sided matching, introduced by [2], analyzes such matching prob-
lems between two types of agents, such as between workers and ¯rms, between
applicants and universities and between men and women.
One of the most attractive application of the matching theory is to design
mechanisms which determine a matching in any markets. Empirical studies
have shown that mechanisms satisfying some properties often succeed whereas
ones not satisfying the properties often fail in the real world applications. See
[4] for evidence.
In designing mechanisms, the stability and strategic properties have critical
importance. A mechanism is stable if no agent and no pair of agent have incen-
tive to deviate from the outcome produced by the mechanism and is strategy-
proof if no agent can manipulate the outcomes by misrepresenting one's prefer-
ence. If some agents deviate from the outcome, or can manipulate the outcome,
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the other agents may not participate in the market thus the two properties are
signi¯cant for designing mechanisms.
Unfortunately, [3] showed that, for designing matching mechanisms, these
two important properties are incompatible. This is often called \impossibility
theorem".1 Even if we weaken the stability property as e±ciency and individual
rationality, the impossibility still holds ([1]). In order to solve the impossibility,
they restricted the domain of preference pro¯les and proved that if and (essen-
tially) only if the preference pro¯les satisfy the top dominance condition, any
mechanism that produces a stable matching is strategy-proof on the restricted
domain. Another approach is introduced by [6]. They introduced the prop-
erty called respect for unanimity that is weaker than e±ciency and showed that
there exists a mechanism that respects unanimity, is individually rational and is
strategy-proof on the domain of all possible preference pro¯les. This seems an
positive result, but the mechanism obtained here selects the matching in which
all agents remain single in most cases. To improve this point, they replaced re-
spect for unanimity as respect for pairwise unanimity that is a stronger property
than respect for unanimity but weaker than e±ciency, then again, they obtained
an impossibility result, that is, there exists no mechanism that respects pairwise
unanimity and is strategy-proof on the domain of all possible preference pro¯les.
In this paper, we resolve the impossibility introduced by [6] by restricting
the domain of preference pro¯les. In our restriction, we pay attention to how
each agent evaluates oneself in one's preferences. Previous researches pay little
attention to the point, however, in the marriage market, the point is important
for the following two reasons. The ¯rst, in some situations, agents may prefer
remaining single unless they match their ideal partners. The second is the
recent trend of a rise of unmarried rate. According to census ¯gures in Japan,
the unmarried rates of men in their early 30s/women in their late 20s in 2000
is triple/more than two times and a half than those of in 1975, respectively.
The rates of men and women in the other generations has been rising and, in
countries in the EU, the same trend is seen. One of the cause of the rise of the
rate is that, for many people, the evaluation of staying single is getting higher
and higher.
Re°ecting these situations, we restrict agents' preference pro¯les and obtain
the positive result, that is, any mechanism that respects pairwise unanimity and
is individually rational is strategy-proof on the restricted domain. In addition,
we show that there exist no domain of preference pro¯les that strictly includes
the above mentioned domain and on which any mechanism that respects pair-
wise unanimity and is individually rational is strategy-proof.
Moreover, the above mentioned domain is closely related to uniqueness of
matching. We consider the relationships between strategy-proofness of mecha-
nisms and uniqueness of matching.
The paper is constructed as follows. De¯nitions and notations are provided
in Section 2. Main results which resolve the impossibility are presented in
Section 3. The relationships between the results and uniqueness of matching
are considered in Section 4. A comparison between our result and previous
results are mentioned in Section 5. Some remarks are given in Section 6.
1We sometimes call a various kind of impossibility theorem \a impossibility."
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2 Preliminaries
We consider marriage markets. Let M and W are ¯nite and disjoint sets of
men and women, respectively. Each man m 2 M has a strict, transitive and
complete preference Pm over W [ fmg and each woman w 2 W has a strict,
transitive and complete preference Pw over M [fwg. For each m 2M , Let Pm
be a set of all possible preference on W [ fmg and similarly, for each w 2 W ,
let Pw be a set of all possible preferences on M [ fwg. A triple (M;W;P ) is a
marriage market where P 2 P =Qi2M[W Pi.
A matching ¹ is a mapping from the set M [W onto itself satisfying (i) for
all m 2 M ¹(m) 2 W [ fmg, (ii) for all w 2 W , ¹(w) 2 M [ fwg and (iii) for
all i 2M [W , ¹(¹(i)) = i. We call ¹(i) the mate of i in ¹.
De¯nition 1 (Individual Rationallity; IR). A matching ¹ is individually ratio-
nal (IR) at preference pro¯le P if ¹(i)Pii or ¹(i) = i for all i 2M [W .
De¯nition 2 ((Pareto) E±ciency; EF). A matching ¹ is (Pareto) E±cient
(EF) at preference pro¯le P if there exist no matching ¹0 6= ¹ such that for all
i 2M [W with ¹0(i) 6= ¹(i), ¹0(i)Pi¹(i).
De¯nition 3 (Blocking pair). A blocking pair of ¹ at preference pro¯le P is a
pair fm;wg 2M £W such that wPm¹(m) and mPw¹(w).
De¯nition 4 (Stablity). A matching ¹ is stable at preference pro¯le P if it is
individually rational and there exist no blocking pair of ¹.
Note that stability implies IR and EF. But the following example illustrates
that the converse does not hold.
Example 1. Let M = fm;m0g, W = fw;w0g and
P = f wPmw0Pmm; wPm0w0Pm0m0; m0PwmPww; mPw0m0Pw0w0 g:
A matching
¹ =
µ
m m0
w w0
¶
is IR and EF but not stable since a pair fm0; wg blocks ¹.2
LetM be the set of all possible matching on M [W . A mechanism is a pro-
cedure to determine a matching for each marriage market, that is, a mechanism
on P is a mapping Á from P to M.
A mechanism is IR/EF/stable if an outcome yielded by the mechanism is
IR/EF/stable for each marriage market, respectively.
For each i 2M [W , let Qi µ Pi be a subset of all possible preferences of i
and let Q =Qi2M[W Qi. By de¯nition, Q µ P.
De¯nition 5 (Manipulability). A mechanism Á is manipulable on Q by a agent
i 2M [W at P 2 Q via P 0i 2 Qi if (Á(M;W;P=P 0i ))(i)Pi(Á(M;W;P ))(i) where
P=P 0i is a preference pro¯le obtained from P by changing i's preference from Pi
to P 0i and keeping all the other preferences.
2These representations of matchings is the same as that of in [5]. In ¹, a man and a
women on the same vertical are matched to each other and an agent with no mate on its
vertical remains single.
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De¯nition 6 (Strategy-proofness; SP). A mechanism is strategy-proof (SP) on
Q if it is not manipulable at any pro¯le P 2 Q by any agent via any preference.
In other words, a mechanism is SP if it is a dominant strategy for each agent
to announce its true preference.3
For designing mechanisms in which agents voluntarily participate, the above
properties are of quite importance. If mechanisms are not IR, agents do not
participate in the mechanisms. If mechanisms are not EF nor stable, agents
deviate from the outcome produced by the mechanisms. If mechanisms are not
SP, agents who desire to obtain better outcomes have to consider preferences
of the others, but in general, they know nothing about the others' preferences.
The following is, however, impossibility of designing such \ideal" mechanisms.
Remark 1 ([3]). There exist no mechanism that is stable and SP on P.
[1] showed that there exists a possibility of designing a stable and strategy-
proof mechanism by restricting the domain of preference pro¯les. Without re-
stricting the domain of preference pro¯les, [6] studied the possibility of strategy-
proof mechanisms. They relaxed e±ciency to the following weaker property.
De¯nition 7 (Respect for pairwise unanimity; RPU ([6])). A matching ¹ re-
spects pairwise unanimity (RPU) if m 2 M prefers w 2 W the best and w
prefers m the best then ¹(m) = w and if i 2M [W prefers oneself the best then
¹(i) = i.
Note that EF implies RPU. But, the following example illustrates that the
converse does not hold.
Example 2. Let M = fm;m0g, W = fw;w0g and
P = f wPmmPmw0; wPm0w0Pm0m0; mPwwPwm0; mPw0m0Pw0w0 g:
A matching
¹ =
µ
m m0 ¡
w ¡ w0
¶
is RPU but not EF since, in a matching
¹0 =
µ
m m0
w w0
¶
;
¹0(m0) 6= ¹(m) and ¹0(m0)Pm0¹(m).
To give an interpretation of RPU, let us consider the following example.
Example 3. Let M = fm;m0g, W = fw;w0g and
P = f w0PmwPmm; w0Pm0wPm0m0; m0PwmPww; m0Pw0mPw0w0 g:
3A dominant strategy for an agent is one's preference that gives the agent better outcomes
than the outcomes obtained by any other preference for any possible preference pro¯le of the
others'.
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Let
¹ =
µ
m m0 ¡
w ¡ w0
¶
:
There exist three blocking pairs of ¹: fm;w0g; fm0; wg and fm0; w0g. When
we consider the stability property, any of the three blocking pairs have the
possibility of blocking and deviate from matching ¹. However, as we mention
the below, the ¯rst two blocking pairs actually does not block the matching ¹,
if agents are not myopic but farsighted, that is, agents concern with not the
immediate state obtained from their deviation but the eventual consequence
obtained from their immediate deviation.
A deviation of fm;w0g from ¹ induces the matching
¹0 =
µ
m m0 ¡
w0 ¡ w
¶
:
But, a matching ¹0 is blocked by a pair fm0; w0g hence it becomes
¹00 =
µ
m m0 ¡
¡ w0 w
¶
:
A matching ¹00 is also blocked by a pair fm;wg and becomes
¹000 =
µ
m m0
w w0
¶
:
There are no blocking pair of ¹000 thus, a deviation of fm;w0g from ¹ induces
further deviations and the matching obtained in the eventual consequence is the
same for m. For the blocking pair fm0; wg, the similar argument holds and the
matching obtained in the eventual consequence is the same for w. On the other
hand, a deviation of fm0; w0g from ¹ induces ¹000 directly and this deviation
makes both m0 and w0 strictly better o®.
Generally, a deviation of a blocking pair who prefer each other the best
makes both of them strictly better o® in any eventual consequence, however, a
deviation of the other blocking pairs may eventually the same for some of them.
Therefore, RPU is the minimally-weakened stability property for a matching.
A mechanism is RPU if an outcome yielded by the mechanism is RPU for
each marriage market. As mentioned before, RPU is the minimally-weakened
stability property on mechanisms. The following shows that, even if we consider
the minimally-weakened stability property, SP and such stability are incompat-
ible in marriage markets.
Remark 2 ([6]). There exists no mechanism that is RPU and SP on P.
3 Strategy-proof mechanisms
In order to resolve the impossibility introduced by [6], we restrict the domain of
preference pro¯les. It is very important since RPU is the minimally-weakened
stability property in marriage market as we mentioned in the previous section.
In our restriction of domain of preference, we pay attention to how each agent
evaluates oneself in one's preference. Previous researches pay little attention to
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the point, however, in marriage market, the point is important for the following
two reasons. The ¯rst, in some situations, agents may prefer remaining single
unless they match their ideal partners. The second is the recent trend of a rise
of unmarried rate. According to census ¯gures in Japan, the unmarried rates
of men in their early 30s/women in their late 20s in 2000 is triple/more than
two times and a half than those of in 1975, respectively. The rates of men and
women in the other generations have been rising and the same trend is also
observed in countries in the EU. One of the cause of the rise of the rates is that,
for many people, the evaluation of staying single is getting higher and higher.
Re°ecting these situations, we restrict agents' preferences as follows.
For each i 2M[W , let ¹Pi ( Pi be a set of preferences which satisfy \i prefers
oneself the best or the second best in i's preference." Let ¹P = Qi2M[W ¹Pi. In
this preference pro¯les, all agents evaluate themselves high rank.
The above restriction of domain of preference pro¯les induces the following
positive result of designing mechanisms in marriage markets.
Theorem 1. Any mechanism that is IR and RPU is SP on ¹P.
Proof. For any i 2M [W , if i prefers oneself the best, then by RPU, i matches
to oneself when i states i's true preference. This is the best outcome for i, thus
i is not manipulable.
If i prefers oneself the second best, then i prefers a member of the opposite
sex the best in i's preference. Let j be the member. If i states i's true preference,
by RPU, i matches to j if j states that i is the best of j's preference. If j does
not state that i is the best of j's preference, by IR, i matches to j or remain
single. However, by the restriction on preferences, in this case, j must state that
j prefers oneself to i and by IR, j is not matched to i. Consequently, i remains
single in this case.
If i represents other preferences with keeping j is the best of i's preference,
we can show that the outcomes of the mechanisms are the same as the case of
stating true preference in the same manner.
If i changes the other member, say k 6= j of opposite sex as the best of
i's preference, by RPU, i matches to k if k states that i is the best of k's
preference and, in the same argument of the above, remains single for any other
cases. In the cases that j states that i is the best or k states that i is the
best, this misrepresentation makes i's outcome worse o®. For other cases, the
outcome for i is remaining single and this is the same as the case of stating
true preference. Thus, this misrepresentation is weakly worse o® from stating
stating true preference.
If i changes oneself as the best of i's preference, by RPU, i remains single
for any others' preferences pro¯le. In the case that j states i is the best, this
misrepresentation makes i's outcome worse o®. In other cases, the outcome for
i is remaining single and it is the same as the case of stating true preference.
Thus, this misrepresentation is weakly worse o® from stating the true preference.
Therefore, any i 2M [W is not manipulable the mechanisms on ¹P.
Note that, the above theorem mentions not a speci¯c but any mechanism
that is IR and RPU. In this sense, the above theorem is stronger than so-called
a possibility theorem. Examples of the mechanisms which are IR and RPU are
the deferred acceptance mechanism introduced by [2] and the mutually best
mechanism mentioned in the proof of Theorem 2 below.
6
One may consider that ¹P is too restrictive. The following theorem, however,
shows that ¹P is the maximal set on which mechanisms that are IR and RPU is
SP.
Theorem 2. There exist no set of preference pro¯le P^ which strictly includes
¹P and on which any mechanism that is IR and RPU is SP.
Proof. First, we de¯ne the mechanism used in the following proof.
Mutually Best Mechanism
Step 1. Agent who prefers a member of opposite sex the best proposes to the
member.
Step 2. Any pair of man and woman who propose with each other get married.
Any other man and woman remain single.
It is straightforward that the above mechanism is RPU and IR.
By the fact that P^ strictly includes ¹P, there exist i 2M[W whose preference
Pi is not in ¹Pi, that is, there exists an agent i who prefers at least two members
of opposite sex j; k to himself. Without loss of generality, let jPik.
In the mutually best mechanism, if i states that i's true preference, imatches
to j if j states that i is j's best and remains single otherwise. But, in the case
that j states that i is not j's best and k states that i is k's best, i matches to
k if i misrepresents i's preference as \k is i's best." Consequently, the mutually
best mechanism is manipulable by i at a preference pro¯le in P^.
Together with Theorem 1, we prove the necessary and su±cient conditions
of the domain of preference pro¯les on which any mechanism that is IR and
RPU is SP.
As we mentioned before, census ¯gures in Japan shows that the number of
people who prefer oneself has increased in recent years. Thus, our restriction of
preference pro¯les are justi¯ed in both theoretically and empirically.
4 Uniqueness of matching
The positive results obtained in the previous section are closely related to
uniqueness of matching. In the domain of preference pro¯les ¹P that we men-
tioned in the previous section, the matching that is IR and RPU is unique and,
as shown in the end of this section, it implies that the domain of preference
pro¯les on which mechanisms that is IR and RPU is SP is su±cient condition
of the domain in which matching that is IR and RPU is unique.
To prove the result, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In a marriage market (M;W;P ) with P 2 ¹P, any pair of man and
woman who match with each other in a matching that is IR at P prefer each
other the best.
Proof. Let ¹ be a matching that is IR. For any i 2 M [W with ¹(i) = j and
j 6= i, IR implies that ¹(i)Pii and ¹(j)Pjj. By the fact that P 2 ¹P, i prefers
oneself to any other k 6= j; i and j prefers oneself to any other k 6= i; j and
consequently i and j prefer each other the best.
By Lemma 1, the following holds.
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Theorem 3. In any marriage market (M;W;P ) with P 2 ¹P, a matching ¹
that is IR and RPU at P is unique.
Proof. In a marriage market (M;W;P ) with P 2 ¹P, suppose that there exist
two matchings ¹; ¹0 (¹ 6= ¹0) each of which is IR and RPU at P . Then, there
exists an agent i 2 M [W such that ¹(i) 6= ¹0(i). Without loss of generality,
let ¹(i)Pi¹0(i).
If ¹0(i) 6= i, by Lemma 1 i prefers ¹0(i) the best. This contradicts the fact
that there exists another member ¹(i) such that ¹(i)Pi¹0(i).
If ¹0(i) = i, (i) i prefers oneself the best or (ii) there exist a member k in
the opposite sex whom i prefers the best does not prefer i the best. In the case
of (i), ¹(i)Pi¹0(i) = i is a contradiction. In the case of (ii), by the supposition
¹(i) 6= ¹0(i), ¹(i) 6= i. By Lemma 1, i and ¹(i) prefer each other the best at P .
This contradicts that ¹0 is RPU.
Unlike Theorem 2, the following example shows that there exists a preference
pro¯les P 62 ¹P on which a matching that is IR and RPU at P is unique.
Example 4. Let M = fm;m0g, W = fw;w0g and
P = f wPmw0Pmm; w0Pm0m0Pm0w; mPwwPwm0; m0Pw0w0Pw0m g:
In this example, Pm 62 ¹Pm but,
¹ =
µ
m m0
w w0
¶
is a unique matching that is IR and RPU at P .
By Theorems 1,2 and 3, we obtain the following.
Corollary 1. Any marriage market (M;W;P ) with P 2 P^ has a unique match-
ing that is IR and RPU at P if any mechanism that is IR and RPU is SP on
P^.
5 Discussion
Table 1: Related Papers
papers n properties IR RPU Stability SP Preferences
Roth(1982) ° ° ° £ any
Alcalde & Barberµa(1994) ° ° ° ° restricted
Takagi & Serizawa(2006) ° ° £ £ any
Our paper ° ° £ ° restricted
Table 1 summarizes our result and previous researches. Since the result
provided by [1] also satis¯es IR, RPU and SP on a domain of preference pro¯les,
it is worth mentioning the relationships between the domain considered in [1]
and ours.
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De¯nition 8 (Top dominance condition ([1])). For each i 2 M [W , a set of
preferences ~Pi µ Pi satis¯es top dominance condition if for any Pi; P 0i 2 ~Pi and
any x; y 2M [W such that (i) xPii or x = i, (ii) yP 0i i or y = i and (iii) xPiy
and yP 0ix, then there exists no z 2M [W such that zPix and zP 0iy.
[1] showed that there exist mechanisms which are stable and SP on the
domain of preferences pro¯les in which all agents in one side satisfy the top
dominance condition.
The following example illustrates that our domain of preference pro¯les im-
plies the domain of preference pro¯les mentioned in [1], but the converse does
not hold.
Example 5. Let M = fm;m0g and W = fw;w0g. A set of m's preferences
¹Pm = f wPmmPmw0; w0P 0mmP 0mw; mP 00mwP 00mw0; mP 000mw0P 000mw g
satis¯es both our restriction and the top dominance condition. While a set of
m's preferences
~Pm = f wP ¤mw0P ¤mm; w0P ¤¤m wP ¤¤m m; mP 00mwP 00mw0 g
satis¯es the top dominance condition but does not satisfy our restriction.
Even if our domain of preference pro¯les implies the domain of preference
pro¯les mentioned in [1], Theorem 2 implies that there exist no mechanism that
is IR, RPU and SP on the domain of preferences pro¯les mentioned in [1]. This
result is derived from the fact that we consider just a weaker condition than
stability.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we resolve the impossibility introduced by [6] by restricting agents
preferences in marriage markets. Our restriction is justi¯ed by both theoretically
and empirically and also is related to uniqueness of matching.
Our results can be extended to college admission markets introduced by [2].
In college admission markets, a set of agents (students or workers) in one side
are matched to each agent (college or ¯rm) in the other side.
Let S;C be a set of students and colleges, respectively, and let qc be a quota
of each college c 2 C. Similar as marriage market, each agent in one side has
strict, transitive and complete preferences over the other set and oneself. The
following is an example of college admission markets.
Example 6. Let S = fs; s0; s00g, C = fc; c0g, qc = 1, qc0 = 2 and
P = f cPssPsc0; c0Ps0s0Ps0c; c0Ps00s00Ps00c; sPccPcs0Pcs00; s0Pc0s00Pc0cPc0s g:
Since marriage markets are considered as college admission markets with the
quota of each college is equal to 1, our restriction of the domain of preference
pro¯les is extended to the following way: \Each student prefers oneself the best
or the second best" and \each college c with its quota qc prefers itself at least
qc+1-th best at its preferences." Note that the preference pro¯les in Example 6
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satis¯es this condition and the similar results provided in this paper hold, that
is, a matching
¹ =
µ
s s0s00
c c0
¶
is a unique matching that is IR and RPU and any mechanism that is IR and
RPU is SP on the above mentioned domain of preference pro¯les.4
There are many other variations of de¯nition of college admission markets:
the preferences of colleges is de¯ned directly on the collection of sets of students
that include students less than its quota and satisfy some properties such as
responsiveness or substitutability. Generalizations of our results to the various
college admission markets is our future research.
Acknowledgement; The authors thank Yukihiko Funaki for helpful comments
and discussions.
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